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Abstract 
Does the accuracy of verdicts improve or worsen if individual jurors on a panel are barred from 
deliberating prior to casting their votes? I study this question in a model where jurors can choose 
to exert costly effort to improve the accuracy of their individual decisions. I find that, provided 
the cost of effort is not too large, there is a threshold jury size above which it is better to allow 
jurors to deliberate. For panels smaller than this threshold, it is more effective to instruct jurors to 
vote on the basis of their private information, without deliberations, and to use a simple majority 
rule to determine the collective decision (regardless of the voting rule used with deliberations). 
The smaller the cost of paying attention, the larger the threshold above which the switch to 
allowing deliberations becomes optimal. However, if the unanimity rule had to be maintained 
under the no-deliberations system, it would be better to allow deliberation. The results apply to 
binary decision making in any committee where the committee members incur some effort in 
reviewing the evidence. Examples are tenure and promotion committees and some board of 
director meetings on issues such as whether to dismiss a CEO. 
Keywords: Jury deliberations, free riding, costly attention, secret voting, committees. 
JEL Classification: D82, D71, D72, H4. 
1. Introduction 
Jury deliberation is a feature of most modern jury trials. Jurors are given elaborate instructions 
on how to deliberate, and the process is, at least in theory, shrouded in secrecy. However, there 
are also instances of jury trials where jurors are explicitly forbidden to deliberate. Instead, they 
are asked to cast their votes in secret, without consultation, and the collective decision is taken 
by applying the simple majority rule to the votes cast – much like the procedure followed in 
elections. This is the case in Brazil – where a panel of seven jurors is used for criminal trials and 
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verdict is based on simple majority (Leib, 2007) – and was also historically the case in classical 
Athens (Guha 2011, Hansen 1991)2. Each juror was given a hollow disc and a solid one, and cast 
their votes by choosing which of these discs to insert into a bronze urn, in such a manner that no 
one could observe which disc they had inserted (the other disc was discarded in a wooden urn so 
that other jurors could not infer one’s vote by examining the remaining disc). The judgment was 
made through counting the number of solid versus hollow discs in the bronze urn after all votes 
had been cast, and votes were aggregated using a simple majority rule (in later jury trials, the 
number of jurors was odd to avoid a hung jury3). The trial was settled in the course of one 
working day (nine and a half hours) during which jurors did not communicate or leave the 
courtroom. Thus, there was scant opportunity to share information and no pressure to do so. 
This triggers the question of whether it is better – in terms of the accuracy of the final verdict 
– to bar deliberations among the members of the jury, or to allow them. I investigate this 
question using a simple model that involves costly juror effort; each juror chosen for a panel may 
simply sit through the trial without paying attention; alternatively, he may pay attention, at a 
cost, dramatically improving the accuracy of his individual votes. I find that to improve the 
accuracy of jury verdicts, it is optimal to allow deliberation in large jury panels, but to bar 
deliberations in smaller panels – provided that when jurors vote without deliberations, the 
decision rule is simple majority. This result holds provided the cost of paying attention is not too 
large. The smaller the cost to paying attention, the larger the zone over which deliberations 
should be barred.  
Intuitively, this result stems from an interplay of three forces – the temptation to free ride on 
other jurors’ efforts rather than pay attention oneself, the fact that deliberations allow 
information pooling for a given probability of paying attention, and the differential rate at which 
the probability of being pivotal declines in jury size with and without deliberations (it decreases 
more sharply in the latter regime). As explained in detail in a later sub-section, the first force, 
free riding, is a more severe problem if deliberations are allowed, while the second and third 
forces tend to favor permitting deliberations in the interests of a more accurate verdict. The first 
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force is stronger than the second and third forces when jury size is below a threshold, and is 
overwhelmed by them at larger jury sizes, triggering the result. 
If, however, a unanimous rule has to be used even when jurors are not allowed to deliberate, I 
find that deliberations should not be barred. Moreover, it is possible that jurors themselves may 
prefer deliberations, even if deliberating were to reduce the probability of delivering a correct 
verdict. 
While I focus on the example of jurors, the results of the model also apply to committees 
where a binary decision has to be made after all the group members review (the same) evidence. 
Examples could be tenure and promotion committees. Some board of director meetings also 
involve making binary decisions, such as whether to dismiss or retain a CEO. Moreover, 
members of such committees have to devote some effort to effectively review the evidence; they 
may choose to be inattentive at this stage, instead. Then, the question answered by the paper 
would be whether members of such committees should vote without deliberating, and their votes 
be aggregated to determine the overall decision, or whether they should consult each other prior 
to a decision. Obviously, this question is of importance because even after a fixed committee has 
been finalized, varying the decision procedure by encouraging or barring deliberations is likely 
to be an option. 
Coughlan (2000) shows that jurors receiving private signals will vote sincerely – fully 
revealing private information – when they can share information prior to casting the final vote, 
by conducting a non-binding “straw poll”. Thus, Coughlan finds that deliberation in this sense is 
beneficial. Austen-Smith and Fedderson (2006) show that if jurors have different preferences, 
deliberation may not lead to sincere voting; though it may do so if a majority voting rule is used, 
it will not do so if a unanimity rule is used. Intuitively, the jurors have strategic incentives to 
distort their information because of their different objectives. These two papers are somewhat 
similar to mine in that they touch, although indirectly, on the issue of barring versus allowing 
deliberations. However, they differ from my paper in several key respects. First, in neither of 
them do jurors find it costly to pay attention. By incorporating this motive, I can consider the 
differential incentives of the jurors to free ride on other jurors’ efforts in both regimes (with and 
without deliberations). Thus, unlike Coughlan, I find that it is better to bar deliberations for a 
small enough jury panel, even though jurors’ preferences are identical. Unlike Austen-Smith and 
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Fedderson, jurors in my model have identical preferences. Moreover, my result that there is a 
threshold jury size at which it becomes optimal to switch from a no-deliberations regime to one 
allowing deliberations, is unique. Neither of these papers relates the optimality of deliberations 
to the size of the jury panel. 
Models with costly juror participation include Mukhopadhyaya (2003) and Guha (2016). The 
first of these focuses on optimal jury size when deliberation is a part of jury trials, and shows that 
small panels generally work best. The second derives implications for optimal jury size when 
ballots are secret and uninformed jurors are more likely than not to make mistakes. Instead of 
focusing on optimal jury size, the current paper looks at whether, given a certain jury size, 
allowing or barring deliberations will result in a more accurate verdict. Models where individual 
decision makers in a group may incur effort or informational costs, affecting group outcomes, 
include Martinelli (2006), Koriyama and Szentes (2009), Cai (2009), and Triossi (2013). In 
McCannon and Walker (2016), jurors endogenously choose to invest in acquiring “competence” 
and can free ride on each other’s investments. More generally, the Condorcet jury theorem has 
spawned a vast literature, which does not necessarily consider costly participation. A strand of 
the literature which examined the assumption that voters may not vote sincerely (but may take 
their probability of being pivotal into account) includes Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), 
Fedderson and Pesendorfer (1998), and Persico (2004). The two latter papers looked at the 
effectiveness of supermajority rules versus simple majority rules when different jurors receive 
independent signals and vote strategically. 
Another strand in the literature has focused on modeling jury deliberation. Neilson and 
Winter (2008) model a process of protracted deliberations, in which the same jurors can vote 
several times, and can influence the opinions of other jurors regarding a continuous variable, the 
strength of evidence against the defendant. Deliberations stop only when further deliberation 
does not produce any change in the individual jurors’ beliefs. Luppi and Parisi (2013), while 
investigating the effect of jury size on the frequency of hung jury rates, model juror deliberation 
in terms of information cascades. In their model, each juror sequentially states his opinion, and 
the next juror places only some weight on his own opinion, while also giving weight to the 
average opinion expressed by the jurors who preceded him. The weight given to others’ opinions 
increases the further down in the sequence one proceeds. Hummel (2012) and Helland and Raviv 
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(2008) also model jury deliberation and its effect on the optimal size of the jury. Hummel (2012) 
shows that the Condorcet theorem continues to hold if jurors differ in their preferences, provided 
each juror shares preferences with a small fraction of other jurors. Helland and Raviv (2008) 
show that if jurors receive independent signals which they truthfully reveal in an open vote, and 
jury deliberation follows a random walk, then the number of jurors has no effect on the 
correctness of the decision. The psychology literature has also studied jury deliberation, with 
some (eg Salerno and Diamond 2010) arguing that group recall may actually be worse when the 
group deliberates – because individuals who remember facts wrongly make others with accurate 
memories unsure – than when individual members of the group vote without deliberation. 
Finally, some other work discusses the effects of communication in committees. For 
example, Buechel and Mechtenburg (2016) show that when some members on a committee are 
uninformed, while others (experts) receive an imperfect signal and may advise the non-experts; 
communication prior to voting may actually decrease informational efficiency. 
 Section 2 contains the models and results. The models without and with deliberations are 
laid out in sections 2.1 and 2.2, while section 2.3 derives the main result. Section 2.4 contains an 
intuitive discussion. Section 2.5 shows that the main result is qualitatively unaffected if jurors 
who pay attention cannot be sure of making the correct decision. Section 2.6 derives results for 
the unanimity rule, while section 2.7 contains a robustness check. Section 3 concludes. 
2. Analysis 
There are a total of n jurors on a panel. To eliminate the possibility of a hung jury, I focus on 
odd-sized panels. Each juror can choose to pay attention at a cost c, where 0<c<0.25. If he does 
so, he observes a perfectly informative signal that conveys the true state of the defendant’s guilt 
or innocence (I relax the assumption that the signal is perfectly informative in a later sub-section, 
section 2.5). The prior probability of the defendant being either guilty or innocent is ½: these 
priors are known to all jurors.4 An inattentive juror does not incur the cost of attention, but 
neither does he receive a signal. Each juror obtains a benefit normalized to 1 if the panel, as a 
whole, reaches the correct verdict. If jurors are inattentive, and unable to free ride on the 
informational flows of other jurors, they vote according to the uninformative priors, pronouncing 
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the defendant to be either guilty or innocent with probability ½.5 Each juror’s utility function is 
given by  U=p-σc where σ denote the probability that a juror pays attention, and p denote the 
probability of the jury panel reaching the correct verdict. 
In both models below – with or without deliberation – I focus on symmetric mixed strategy 
equilibria in which jurors randomize between paying attention and sleeping during the trial (that 
is, for any two jurors I and J, we have 0<σI =σJ <1). I do this following Mukhopadhyaya (2003), 
who argues that if jurors are identical, symmetric outcomes are more likely than asymmetric 
ones, since the latter would involve the problem of determining which jurors behave 
asymmetrically. (It can be easily shown that neither model has a symmetric pure strategy 
equilibrium where all jurors are attentive). 
Had we focused instead on asymmetric pure strategy equilibria, we would have found one in 
the model without deliberation where a bare majority of jurors (exactly (n+1)/2 out of n) pays 
attention and delivers the correct verdict with probability 1 (see Guha (2016)) and one in the 
deliberation model where exactly one juror out of n pays attention, again delivering the correct 
verdict with probability 1. However, equilibrium selection is a real issue in both models. Since 
jurors do not communicate until after the trial, they have no way of co-ordinating on which juror 
(or, in the no-deliberation case, which subset of jurors) should pay attention. Even if such co-
ordination were possible, this would raise issues of how to compensate the juror(s) paying 
attention. Thus, under the assumption that jurors do not, indeed, communicate before the trial, 
we focus on symmetric mixed strategy equilibria in both models. 
2.1 Secret voting and no deliberations 
The model where jurors do not deliberate is adapted from the benchmark model of Guha (2016). 
For the present, I consider the case where a simple majority rule is used to aggregate the 
individual jurors’ votes. 
Lemma 1. Suppose there are no juror deliberations, votes are aggregated through simple 
majority, and that n is no larger than the largest odd integer n* for which 𝑐 <
(𝑛−1)!
(
𝑛−1
2
)!(
𝑛−1
2
)!2𝑛
. 
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Then a unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium exists with each juror paying attention with 
probability σND =√1 − 4𝜅2/(𝑛−1), where 𝜅 =
2𝑐
(𝑛−1)!
(
𝑛−1
2
)!(
𝑛−1
2
)!
. 
Proof. Since jurors do not deliberate, an individual juror can receive the signal only if he pays 
attention. It is worthwhile for him to incur the cost of doing so only if his probability of being 
pivotal, and thus changing the collective outcome, is high enough. The probability of any one 
juror being pivotal is the probability that half of the other n-1 jurors vote correctly, while half 
vote incorrectly, so that there is a tie. Note that the probability of a juror voting correctly is the 
sum of the probability that he pays attention (σ) and the probability that he is inattentive but 
guesses correctly (
1−𝜎
2
). This sum is thus (
1+𝜎
2
), while the probability of a juror voting 
incorrectly is the probability that he is inattentive and guesses incorrectly (
1−𝜎
2
). Thus, the 
probability of being pivotal is 
(𝑛−1)!
(
𝑛−1
2
)!(
𝑛−1
2
)!
(
1+𝜎
2
)(𝑛−1)/2(
1−𝜎
2
)(𝑛−1)/2 = 𝑃(𝑛, 𝜎(𝑛))                                        (1) 
In the event of being pivotal, an individual juror would receive a benefit of 1 from paying 
attention, as by doing so, he votes correctly and ensures that there is a majority of correct votes, 
guaranteeing the correct verdict. If he does not pay attention, he can still expect a benefit of ½, as 
this is the probability that his uninformed vote will be correct (and thus also the probability that 
the verdict is correct). Therefore, his expected benefit from paying attention is ½ times the 
probability that he is pivotal, while his cost of doing so is c. In a mixed strategy equilibrium, his 
expected benefit must exactly equal his cost, so that 
𝑃(𝑛,𝜎(𝑛))
2
= 𝑐                                                    (2) 
Solving (1) and (2), we then obtain the solution for σ, σND =√1 − 4𝜅2/(𝑛−1), given in the 
statement of the Lemma. Moreover, this solution is well-defined as long as the expression in the 
square root is non-negative, which is the case if 𝜅2/(𝑛−1) <
1
4
. From the definition of κ, this is 
equivalent to the restriction that 𝑐 <
(𝑛−1)!
(
𝑛−1
2
)!(
𝑛−1
2
)!2𝑛
. As shown in Guha (2016), the RHS of this 
restriction is decreasing in n, and there is therefore some maximum odd integer n* which 
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satisfies this restriction. Moreover, this integer is at least 3, because the RHS of the restriction for 
n = 3 is ¼, and we always have c<1/4. It is clear that given n, σND is unique. QED 
 The probability that a correct verdict is made by the panel is the probability that at least 
(n+1)/2 jurors vote correctly, or 
∑
𝑛!
𝑗!(𝑛−𝑗)!
𝑛
𝑗=(𝑛+1)/2 (
1+𝜎𝑁𝐷
2
)𝑗(
1−𝜎𝑁𝐷
2
)𝑛−𝑗 = 𝑝𝑁𝐷(𝑛)                                (3) 
 As shown in Guha (2016), and as our numerical examples will illustrate later, both σND 
and 𝑝𝑁𝐷decrease in jury size, n. Intuitively, a larger panel reduces the probability, fixing σ, that 
an individual juror will be pivotal, tending to reduce his expected benefit from paying attention 
below his cost of doing so. To restore the equality, and thereby induce him to pay attention with 
at least some probability, it is necessary that all the other jurors be less attentive when the panel 
size goes up, so that the probability that some of them are incorrect, resulting in a tie, increases – 
thus pushing up the pivotal probability again. 
2.2 Jury deliberations 
 We now turn to the model with jury deliberations. In this model, jurors always pool 
information, so that having even one informed juror is sufficient to guarantee the correct verdict. 
This is so regardless of the voting rule – all uninformed jurors have the incentive to agree with 
the informed juror, as he knows the correct verdict for certain. This is similar to Mukhopadhyaya 
(2003). However, while he assumes that an incorrect decision is always made when no juror pays 
attention, I assume – to be consistent with the no-deliberation model – that when the panel lacks 
information (because all jurors were inattentive) it still deliberates and makes a correct verdict 
with probability ½, by a collective lucky guess. Thus, the expressions for the probability of 
individual jurors’ paying attention, σD, and the probability of a correct verdict, pD, that I derive 
here differ from those derived in Mukhopadhyaya (2003). 
Lemma 2. Suppose there are jury deliberations. Then a unique symmetric mixed strategy 
equilibrium exists with 𝜎𝐷 = 1 − (2𝑐)
1/(𝑛−1), and 𝑝𝐷 = 1 −
1
2
(2𝑐)𝑛/(𝑛−1). 
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Proof. Now, a juror expects to be pivotal only if no other juror is paying attention, so that, by 
paying attention, he can increase the probability of a correct verdict from ½ to 1.6 This pivotal 
probability is (1 − 𝜎)𝑛−1. Thus, his expected benefit from paying attention is half times this 
pivotal probability, which is then equated to his cost of paying attention: ½ (1 − 𝜎)𝑛−1 = 𝑐, 
yielding 𝜎𝐷 = 1 − (2𝑐)
1/(𝑛−1). Note that the only event in which the panel makes the wrong 
verdict is if no juror pays attention and their collective guess is unlucky – an event which 
happens with probability ½ (1 − 𝜎𝐷)
𝑛. Thus, the probability of reaching the correct verdict is 1-
½ (1 − 𝜎𝐷)
𝑛. Substituting in for 𝜎𝐷, this yields 𝑝𝐷 = 1 −
1
2
(2𝑐)𝑛/(𝑛−1). Given our restrictions 
on c, both expressions are positive and less than 1, and both decrease in jury size, n. QED 
Note that Lemma 2 is independent of the voting rule used: as long as one juror pays attention, 
all jurors pool information and vote according to the (perfectly accurate) information he supplies 
them with. 
2.3 A comparison 
We now compare the case where jurors deliberate with the case where they do not. First, note 
that if there were just one juror, the issue is moot as deliberation has no meaning. We, therefore, 
restrict our attention to odd-sized jury panels with 3 or more jurors. 
Proposition 1. The accuracy of a panel’s verdict where jurors are barred from deliberations, 
and the simple majority rule is used, is higher than the accuracy of the verdict of a panel where 
jurors are instructed to deliberate, for panel sizes smaller than a threshold n(c)≥3, provided 
0<c≤ .13, while allowing jury deliberations results in a more accurate verdict for larger panels. 
The threshold is decreasing in c. 
Proof. Step 1. Here, we show that 𝑝𝐷 > 𝑝𝑁𝐷 for large n. As noted in Lemma 1, when 
deliberations are barred, jurors only pay attention for a finite panel, with a maximum of n* 
members. In a larger panel, no one would pay attention and so 𝑝𝑁𝐷 would fall to .5, the 
probability of a majority of the jurors guessing correctly. However, lim
𝑛→∞
𝑝𝐷 = 1 − 𝑐 > .75 
(given c<.25). Since 𝑝𝐷 is decreasing in n, its value is even higher for finite n>n*. 
                                                          
6 Recall that when jurors do not pay attention, they still deliberate as a group and can make a lucky guess with 
probability ½. 
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Step 2. Next, we show that when n = 3, 𝑝𝐷 < 𝑝𝑁𝐷 provided c≤ .13. Substituting in for the value 
of n and simplifying, we find that the condition that 𝑝𝐷(3) < 𝑝𝑁𝐷(3) is equivalent to 
(1 + 2𝑐)√1 − 4𝑐 + 2𝑐√2𝑐 > 1                                                (4) 
First, note that the two sides of the inequality are equal when c = 0. While the RHS is invariant 
with respect to c, differentiation reveals that the LHS is strictly increasing in c up to c = 1/12. 
Therefore, inequality (4) necessarily holds for this range of c. Beyond this value the LHS starts 
decreasing, but remains above the RHS until c = .13; beyond this value, it dips below the RHS, 
as shown in Fig 1. Thus, for a panel of 3 jurors, barring deliberations results in a higher 
probability of an accurate verdict, provided c≤ .13. 
Step 3. Steps 1 and 2 establish that 𝑝𝐷 < 𝑝𝑁𝐷 at n = 3 and that 𝑝𝐷 > 𝑝𝑁𝐷 for n > n*. This proves 
that the functions 𝑝𝐷(𝑛) and 𝑝𝑁𝐷(𝑛) must cross each other an odd number of times. 
Step 4. Here, we prove that the functions 𝑝𝐷(𝑛) and 𝑝𝑁𝐷(𝑛) must cross each other just once. 
Suppose, to the contrary, that they cross an odd number of times greater than 1. Note that the two 
functions are equal at n = 1(with a perfectly accurate judgment). Since 𝑝𝐷 < 𝑝𝑁𝐷 at n = 3, and 
since the two functions intersect at least once, by Step 3, the 𝑝𝐷(𝑛) function must have at least 
one point of inflection (which comes before the first intersection). For multiple odd intersections, 
the 𝑝𝐷(𝑛) function must have more than one point of inflection – given that 𝑝𝑁𝐷 is 
monotonically decreasing in n. However, solving for 𝑝𝐷
" (𝑛𝐼) = 0, where 𝑛𝐼 is a point of 
inflection, we find that this yields a unique inflection point, for a given value of c:  
𝑛𝐼 = 1 + .25log (
1
2𝑐
)                                                                     (5) 
Thus, the functions must cross just once, proving the existence of a unique threshold, below 
which barring deliberations is more effective, and above which allowing deliberations results in a 
more accurate verdict. 
Step 5. Finally we establish that this threshold is decreasing in c. From Lemma 1, we see that σND 
and hence (from (3)) 𝑝𝑁𝐷, decrease in c, so that the function 𝑝𝑁𝐷(𝑛) would shift leftwards with 
an increase in c. At the same time, (5) makes it clear that 𝑛𝐼, the inflection point of the 𝑝𝐷(𝑛) 
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function, is decreasing in c. As this function as a whole also shifts to the left with an increase in 
c, the intersection point also occurs at a lower value of n. 
QED 
We now look at examples for specific values of c. 
Fig 2 illustrates the behavior of 𝑝𝐷 and 𝑝𝑁𝐷 for c =0.1, while Fig 4 illustrates their behavior for c 
= 0.02. We see that in the first case, while 𝑝𝐷 < 𝑝𝑁𝐷for n =3, this inequality is reversed for n = 5 
upwards, while in the second case the probability of a correct verdict remains higher in the no-
deliberation case until the odd-sized jury panel exceeds 7 jurors. The corresponding probabilities 
of paying attention under deliberation and no deliberation (secret voting) are shown in Figs 3 and 
5. Numerical values are given in Tables 1 and 2. The Tables also show U – the utility per juror, 
defined by U = p – σc – in the two models. 
Remark 1. Though barring deliberations for a small panel results in more accurate verdicts in 
both examples, jurors are happier (taking the cost of paying attention into account) when 
deliberations are allowed. 
Remark 2. If c>.13, it is better to allow jury deliberations to achieve a more accurate verdict. 
Remark 2 is evident from Figure 1; for relatively high values of c, even at n = 3, we have 𝑝𝐷 >
𝑝𝑁𝐷. By (5), the 𝑝𝐷(𝑛) function has a unique inflection point, and so, if it were to cross the 
𝑝𝑁𝐷(𝑛) function, it could only do so once. However, crossing once would imply that 𝑝𝐷 < 𝑝𝑁𝐷 
for large n, which contradicts Step 1 of Proposition 1. Thus, the two functions do not cross and 
the 𝑝𝐷(𝑛) function lies uniformly above the 𝑝𝑁𝐷(𝑛) function for n>1. 
 
2.4 Discussion and Intuition 
Three distinct forces are at play in determining whether verdicts are more accurate with or 
without jury deliberation. First, deliberation opens up the possibility of free riding. This factor 
tends to increase jurors’ incentives to pay attention when votes are secret and deliberation is not 
an option, since they know that any one other juror’s having been attentive is no longer sufficient 
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to guarantee the correct verdict.7 Increased incentives to pay attention in turn tend to raise the 
probability of reaching a correct verdict when there is no deliberation. Secondly, there is 
information pooling with deliberation, but not without. This factor implies that for a given 
probability of paying attention, allowing deliberation tends to increase the probability of a 
correct verdict. Third, the probability of being pivotal decreases, for a given probability of 
paying attention, with a rise in the number of jurors. This is true both when deliberation is 
allowed – in which case the probability of being pivotal is the probability that the other n-1 
jurors are inattentive – and when it is not, in which case the probability of being pivotal is given 
in equation (1). While this factor means that individual juror probabilities of paying attention 
decrease in jury size, both with and without deliberation, there is an upper limit n* in the case 
without deliberation, above which the probability of being pivotal is too small to make paying 
attention worthwhile. However, if deliberation is allowed, there is no such upper limit (σD tends 
to 0 only as n tends to infinity). Thus, this third factor implies that probabilities of being 
attentive, and therefore of reaching the correct verdict, decrease more dramatically with 
expanding jury size when deliberations are barred8. 
 While the first of these factors increases the effectiveness of panel verdicts when 
deliberations are barred, the second and third factors imply that allowing deliberation is more 
effective. We have already seen that the third factor is stronger in large jury panels than in small 
ones. So is the second. Consider what happens when deliberations are barred. If the jury panel is 
relatively small, the fact that jurors do not pool information does not matter much for the 
accuracy of the verdict, specially as, by the first factor, each individual juror has high incentives 
to be attentive. Thus, barring deliberations works better in small panels. The opposite is true in 
larger panels; with many jurors, the possibility that some may not acquire enough information to 
deliver a correct verdict increases, if information is not pooled. The second and third factors 
dominate the first in large panels. The intuition for the first factor prevailing over a larger jury 
size when the cost of paying attention is small, is that in that case, individual jurors’ incentives to 
be attentive remain high for a relatively large range of jury sizes. However, if the cost of paying 
                                                          
7 Thus, note that the probability of paying attention is consistently higher in the no-deliberation case in Table 2, and 
higher until n=13 in Table 1. 
8Observe in Table 1, where n* = 15, that the probability of paying attention without deliberations falls below the 
corresponding probability with deliberations, as the panel size approaches its maximum feasible limit without 
deliberations. This is not the case in Table 2, because a lower c translates into a higher value of n*. 
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attention is high enough (as in Remark 2) the first factor is overwhelmed by the other two factors 
as jurors’ incentives to pay attention remains relatively small even when there is no possibility of 
free riding. 
 Finally, as Remark 1 shows, jurors themselves may prefer deliberations even when 
barring deliberations would have resulted in a higher probability of the correct verdict. 
Intuitively, this follows because deliberation lowers the need to pay attention, thus lowering 
jurors’ costs from paying attention to a degree which offsets the lower probability of achieving a 
correct verdict. However, it is not certain that jurors’ utility should be used as a criterion to 
decide whether to allow or bar deliberations, since the jury’s costs are not shared by the general 
public, while we may argue that society at large benefits from the justice system delivering 
correct decisions. 
2.5 Imperfect Signals 
In this subsection, we extend the model to the case where even a perfectly attentive juror 
receives the correct signal only with probability q, where ½<q<1. Following the same reasoning 
as before, we concentrate on symmetric mixed strategy equilibria. We find that our results are 
qualitatively unchanged. 
A1: c<
2𝑞−1
4
 
 With no deliberations, the probability of a juror being correct is now the sum of the 
probabilities that he is inattentive and makes a lucky guess, and that he is attentive and receives 
the correct signal. Thus, this sum is now 
1+𝜎(2𝑞−1)
2
, while one minus this probability is the 
probability that a given juror votes incorrectly. Moreover, if a juror were to be pivotal, being 
attentive would raise the probability of arriving at a correct verdict from ½ to q. Thus, instead of 
(1) and (2), we have 
(𝑞 −
1
2
)
(𝑛−1)!
(
𝑛−1
2
)!(
𝑛−1
2
)!
(
1+𝜎(2𝑞−1)
2
)
𝑛−1
2
(
1−𝜎(2𝑞−1)
2
)
𝑛−1
2
= 𝑐                           (6) 
Solving this, we find that with no deliberation and imperfect signals, each juror’s probability of 
paying attention is σND,I =
1
2𝑞−1
√1 − 4(𝜅/(2𝑞 − 1))2/(𝑛−1). Mimicking the proof of Lemma 1, 
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we can show that this is well-defined as long as 𝑐 <
(𝑛−1)!(2𝑞−1)
(
𝑛−1
2
)!(
𝑛−1
2
)!2𝑛
, and thus that the SMSE exists 
up to some finite jury size n**, as the RHS of this restriction is decreasing in n. Moreover, A1 
guarantees that n** is at least 3. The probability of reaching an overall correct verdict is now 
given by 
∑
𝑛!
𝑗!(𝑛−𝑗)!
𝑛
𝑗=(𝑛+1)/2 (
1+𝜎𝑁𝐷,𝐼(2𝑞−1)
2
)𝑗(
1−𝜎𝑁𝐷,𝐼(2𝑞−1)
2
)𝑛−𝑗 = 𝑝𝑁𝐷,𝐼(𝑛)   (7) 
Here, the subscript I indicates that attentive jurors receive imperfect signals. Imperfect signals do 
not change the fact that the probability of paying attention and the probability of reaching an 
overall correct verdict are both decreasing functions of n.  
 With deliberations, a juror is pivotal only if none of the other jurors have been both 
attentive and received an accurate signal. The probability of any one juror being attentive and 
receiving an accurate signal is σq. Thus, a pivotal juror equates expected benefits and costs of 
paying attention: 
(𝑞 −
1
2
) (1 − 𝜎𝑞)𝑛−1 = 𝑐                                             (8) 
This yields the probability of any one juror’s paying attention with deliberation and imperfect 
signals as 𝜎𝐷,𝐼 =
1
𝑞
[1 − (
2𝑐
2𝑞−1
)
1
𝑛−1
]. The probability of an overall correct verdict is one minus the 
probability that no juror is both attentive and receives the correct signal. Thus, we get 𝑝𝐷,𝐼 = 1 −
(
2𝑐
2𝑞−1
)
𝑛
𝑛−1
. Given A1, both expressions are positive and decreasing in n. 
 We can now state a result that parallels Proposition 1. 
Proposition 2. Suppose that attentive jurors receive imperfect signals. The accuracy of a panel’s 
verdict where jurors are barred from deliberations, and the simple majority rule is used, is 
higher than the accuracy of the verdict of a panel where jurors are instructed to deliberate, for 
panel sizes smaller than a threshold n(c)≥3, provided 0<c≤ 
2𝑞−1
6
, while allowing jury 
deliberations results in a more accurate verdict for larger panels. The threshold is decreasing in 
c. 
15 
 
Proof. Step 1. Mimicking Step 1 of Proposition 1, we find that for large n, 𝑝𝐷,𝐼 > 𝑝𝑁𝐷,𝐼. With no 
deliberations, jurors stop paying attention when jury size exceeds n**, so that the overall 
accuracy of the verdict falls to ½, while lim
𝑛→∞
𝑝𝐷,𝐼 = 1 −
2𝑐
2𝑞−1
> 1/2, given A1. 
Step 2. Mimicking Step 2 of Proposition 1, the condition for 𝑝𝐷,𝐼 < 𝑝𝑁𝐷,𝐼 for n = 3 is 
2𝑐
2𝑞−1
√
2𝑐
2𝑞−1
+
1
2
[1 + (1 +
2𝑐
2𝑞−1
)√1 −
4𝑐
2𝑞−1
  >1                               (9) 
Both sides of the inequality are equal at c = 0. Differentiation of the LHS with respect to c 
reveals that it is increasing for c≤ 
2𝑞−1
6
. The RHS being invariant, (9) holds as a strict inequality 
for this range of c. 
Step 3. As in Step 3 of Proposition 1, Steps 1 and 2 establish that the functions 𝑝𝐷,𝐼(𝑛) and 
𝑝𝑁𝐷,𝐼(𝑛) must cross each other an odd number of times. 
Step 4. Mimicking Step 4 of Proposition 1, we establish a unique intersection by showing that the 
function 𝑝𝐷,𝐼(𝑛) has a unique inflection point, which solves 
𝑛𝐼 = 1 + .5log (
2𝑞−1
2𝑐
)                                                                                           (10)                                                       
Step 5. Here we mimic Step 5 of Proposition 1, noting that (10) is decreasing in c. 
QED 
 Thus, the insight that a threshold jury size exists below which it is better to bar 
deliberations, and above which allowing deliberations permits a more accurate verdict, remains 
unaffected if attentive jurors are not certain to make correct decisions. Intuitively, the three 
forces described earlier – free riding, information pooling, and the probability of being pivotal – 
are in force in this case as well. The difference is that, free riding is somewhat less of a problem 
even if deliberations are allowed for, because one attentive juror may no longer be enough to 
guarantee a correct verdict. Nonetheless, for small jury panels, free riding is still a more severe 
problem when deliberations are allowed, ensuring that for small enough jury panels, barring 
deliberations results in a higher verdict accuracy. Moreover, the cost of paying attention must be 
small relative to the accuracy of the signal that an attentive juror receives. 
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So far, we have looked at cases where, when jurors vote without deliberations, the 
collective decision is made using the simple majority rule. What would happen if, instead, the 
unanimity rule were used in such circumstances? We demonstrate below that if unanimity were a 
requirement, barring deliberations would be inferior to allowing jurors to deliberate (we return to 
the benchmark case of perfect signals in the next subsection). 
 
 
2.6 The inferiority of barring deliberations if a unanimity rule is imposed 
Proposition 3. Suppose a unanimity rule were used to aggregate individual jurors’ votes when 
they are barred from deliberating. The accuracy of the verdict of such a panel would then be 
lower than the accuracy of a panel where jurors are instructed to deliberate. 
Proof. Suppose the unanimity rule were imposed when votes were secret. An individual juror 
would be pivotal either if all other jurors voted correctly, or if all other jurors voted incorrectly. 
However, if all other jurors vote incorrectly, the nth juror would not benefit from paying 
attention: even if he were to do so and vote correctly with probability 1, he would not be able to 
affect the outcome, as the unanimity rule is used and as he cannot pool information and affect the 
other jurors’ votes. Therefore, he would not bother to incur the cost of paying attention in this 
event. If, on the other hand, all other jurors vote correctly, which happens with probability 
(
1+𝜎
2
)𝑛−1, (the probability that each of these jurors is either attentive or lucky), the nth juror 
expects a benefit of ½ by paying attention: if he does so, he too votes correctly, ensuring the 
correct outcome, while if he does not do so, he only votes correctly with probability ½. Equating 
the expected benefit and cost of paying attention, therefore, we have 
1
2
(
1+𝜎𝑁𝐷,𝑈
2
)𝑛−1 = 𝑐                                                           (11) 
Here, the subscripts on σ denote the fact that deliberations are not allowed and the unanimity rule 
is used. Note that we have 
1+𝜎𝑁𝐷,𝑈
2
= 1 − 𝜎𝐷(from (11) and Lemma 2). Next, observe that the 
probability of reaching the correct verdict is the probability that all n jurors vote correctly. Thus  
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𝑝𝑁𝐷,𝑈 = (
1+𝜎𝑁𝐷,𝑈
2
)𝑛 = (2𝑐)𝑛/(𝑛−1)                                                              (12) 
From Lemma 2, the probability of reaching the correct verdict when deliberations are allowed is 
𝑝𝐷 = 1 −
1
2
(2𝑐)𝑛/(𝑛−1). Now, comparing this with (12), it is easy to show that 𝑝𝑁𝐷,𝑈 < 𝑝𝐷 is 
equivalent to (2𝑐)𝑛/(𝑛−1) < 2/3. Given that c<0.25, this is always true. QED 
 
2.7 Robustness: different priors 
In the models above, the prior probability of a defendant being either guilty or innocent is ½. 
However, it is possible that because of the way the justice system works, the fact that the 
defendant is up for trial implies a much higher probability of guilt, say r, where r>.5. Suppose, 
as before, that these priors were known to all jurors. Without including a full analysis of this 
case, we conjecture that the main results go through qualitatively. In particular, we have verified 
that a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium exists in the no-deliberation case with σND ={−2𝑟 +
1 + √1 − 4µ
2
𝑛−1} /2(1 − 𝑟), where µ=κ/2(1-r), if n is no larger than the largest odd integer n** 
for which 𝑐 <
(𝑛−1)!𝑟(𝑛−1)/2(1−𝑟)(𝑛+1)/2
(
𝑛−1
2
)!(
𝑛−1
2
)!
. A symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium also exists in the 
deliberation case, with 𝜎𝐷 = 1 − (
𝑐
1−𝑟
)1/(𝑛−1) and 𝑝𝐷 = 1 − (1 − 𝑟)(
𝑐
1−𝑟
)𝑛/(𝑛−1). For the same 
c, the probability of paying attention declines both with and without deliberation, when the prior 
probability of guilt is greater than ½ : intuitively, an uninformed guess is now more likely to be 
correct, reducing incentives to be attentive. In addition, the probability of reaching a correct 
verdict with deliberation also declines, relative to the case with 50-50 priors. This can be traced 
to the reduced probabilities of paying attention. However, in the no-deliberation case, the 
probability of reaching a correct verdict may go either way, because even though the probability 
of paying attention falls, a majority of jurors may now be more likely to be correct, even if they 
have not paid attention. Thus, this might actually strengthen the case for barring deliberations in 
small jury panels. 
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3.Conclusion 
Using a simple model where jurors on a panel need to decide whether to incur costly effort to 
improve the quality of their individual decisions, I investigate the effect of allowing or barring 
deliberation between jurors on the accuracy of jury verdicts. I find that in relatively small jury 
panels, verdicts are more accurate if deliberations are barred and a simple majority rule is used to 
aggregate votes. However, in larger panels, it is better to allow deliberation (irrespective of the 
voting rule used under deliberation). The greater the cost of paying attention, the greater the 
value of allowing deliberations, and the smaller the threshold jury size above which it is more 
effective to allow deliberations. If there is a relatively small cost to paying attention, on the other 
hand, jurors even on a moderately sized panel (for example, one with seven jurors, as in criminal 
trials in Brazil) – should be instructed not to deliberate. If jurors who do not deliberate are 
restricted to use an unanimity rule, however, barring deliberations would always be harmful. A 
similar conclusion would hold if the cost of paying attention were too high. These results carry 
through to contexts outside jury trials, in particular committees which have to make binary 
decisions and where the members incur attention costs in reviewing evidence relevant to their 
decision. Thus barring consultation among the members of such committees may work better if 
the committee is small, and the cost of paying attention is also relatively low. 
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Table 1: σ, p and U in the two models with c = 0.1 
n σND pND σD pD UND=pND - 
σNDc 
UD=pD - 
σDc 
3 .7746 .9648 .5528 .9553 .88734 .90002 
5 .5194 .9065 .3313 .9331 .85456 .89997 
7 .3718 .8549 .2353 .9235 .81772 .89997 
9 .2742 .8058 .1822 .9182 .77838 .89998 
11 .2 .7535 .1487 .9149 .7335 .90003 
13 .14 .6975 .1255 .9126 .6835 .90005 
15 .08 .6238 .1086 .9109 .6158 .90004 
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Table 2: σ, p and U in the two models with c = 0.02 
n σND pND σD pD UND=pND 
- σNDc 
UD=pD - 
σDc 
3 .9592 .9988 .8 .996 .9796 .98 
5 .8206 .9937 .5528 .9911 .9773 .98 
7 .7043 .9885 .4152 .9883 .9744 .9799 
9 .6177 .9838 .3313 .9866 .9714 .9799 
11 .552 .9797 .2752 .9855 .9686 .9799 
13 .5005 .9758 .2353 .9847 .9658 .9799 
15 .459 .9723 .2054 .9841 .9631 .9799 
 
 




